Post-CMEA economic relations of former Soviet Bloc countries and Russia: Continuity and change by Dangerfield, Martin
1 
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s the CMEA was gripped by an intense policy debate 
stimulated by overall economic stagnation and particularly acute crises in the member 
states that had borrowed heavily to finance imports from the West. While the Soviet 
preference was for a renewed emphasis on regional autarky and a future strategy of 
“turning inwards", radical voices in Hungary were calling for a stronger engagement 
with the world economy that would entail a fundamental overhaul of domestic foreign 
trade systems and a shift from plan coordination to full blown market integration in 
the CMEA. In 1985, Hungarian economist András Köves wrote that “a decline in 
East-West trade would not only lower living standards but also increase present 
economic tensions, slow down growth even further, stagnate productivity and thus 
widen the present technological gap between the West and the socialist countries. In 
addition CMEA cooperation would also be seriously harmed: “To restrict relations 
with the developed capitalist countries would not result in any acceleration of 
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integration processes within the CMEA, nor in the increasing role of cooperation in 
the solution of economic tasks with which member-countries are faced.”
1
   
 
This chapter reflects on how economic and trade relations between the three “small” 
Visegrad Group (VG) states - the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia - and 
Russia have developed in the 20 years since the abolition of the CMEA and the 
eventual switch to the kind of trade and integration arrangements advocated by 
Hungarian economists and other like-minded radical economists elsewhere in the 
CMEA. It begins with some brief remarks on the impact of the collapse of the CMEA 
on the trade of Czechoslovakia and Hungary with the USSR. The second section 
focuses on the long period of transition in relations between Russia and the three 
between 1993 and 2003 and has three parts. It covers developments in export to and  
imports from Russia and highlights some key determinants of the trade patterns that 
characterized this period. The role of post-CMEA regional integration processes 
(specifically the Central European Free Trade Agreement – CEFTA) is also 
discussed. Finally, it considers the impact of political perspectives on Russia on 
development of economic relations. The main political parties in each of the three 
tend towards different rhetoric on the question of relations with Russia, raising the 
question of how changing governments have affected both the conduct of economic 
relations with Russia and outcomes in terms of levels of trade and economic 
cooperation.  The third, and most substantive, section covers the period between 2004 
and 2010 and therefore incorporates the consequences of EU membership on 
economic relations with Russia. It highlights post-2004 trade trends and considers the 
main factors which have been influencing the dramatic growth of the three’s exports 
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to Russia. It also focuses on key energy sector partnerships that are the most visible 
remnant of CMEA-era integration and which remain a dominant element of economic 
relations between Russia and the three. It also notes the reinvigoration of broad-based 
intergovernmental instruments charged with promoting trade and economic 
cooperation with Russia and asks whether this is another example of certain CMEA 
“traditions” that have survived. Finally, this revisits the relationship between domestic 
politics in the three and foreign trade strategies towards Russia for the post-2004 era.  
 
1. COLLAPSE OF THE CMEA AND THE “END” OF THE SOVIET 
MARKET 
 
The period between end of communism and EU accession was essentially a long and 
rather protracted period of transition in Czech, Hungarian and Slovak overall relations 
with the USSR and subsequently Russia. During the CMEA era there were of course 
no direct economic relations with Russia and the main reference point is therefore 
economic relations with the USSR. Though the USSR remained the dominant trade 
partner throughout the socialist period, the percentage share of total trade accounted 
for by the USSR diminished throughout the lifetime of the CMEA. By 1989, 
Czechoslovakia’s exports to the USSR were some 30.5 per cent of total while 
Hungary’s were somewhat less at 25.1 per cent. Exports to the OECD countries were 
31.2 per cent of total for Czechoslovakia and 43.1 per cent for Hungary.
2
 By the time 
the CMEA collapsed, therefore both countries, but especially Hungary, had already 
experienced considerable westward trade re-orientation. It seems safe to assume that a 
substantial decline in the relative importance of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
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Republic (RSFSR) as a trade partner occurred over the lifetime of the CMEA even if 
its strategic position as an energy supplier remained stable. 
 
As is well known, the end of communism precipitated a huge adjustment in the 
external trade of all the ex-CMEA countries that entailed a dramatic reduction of their 
mutual trade. For all the Central and Eastern European (CEE) CMEA states this trade 
collapse centred mainly on the USSR and began in 1990 even before the key 
“switchover” to use of world market prices and settlement in convertible currency. In 
1990 the USSR cut oil deliveries to CEE by 30 per cent and the CEE states responded 
with equivalent cuts in their own exports to the USSR. The disruption accelerated 
spectacularly in early 1991. The USSR’s imports from and exports to CEE fell by 
around 60 per cent and 50 per cent respectively during the first quarter of 1991 
compared with the same period in 1990.
3
 A further complication was the question of 
what would happen to the Transferable Rouble (TR) balances that existed at the point 
of the switchover and how the debts/surpluses would be resolved.  
 
Thus relations with the USSR from 1990/91 were essentially a “divorce process” that 
involved a drastic adjustment of bilateral economic and political ties according to the 
new post-Cold War reality. However, as many commentators pointed out at the time, 
the CEE states did not look to deliberately shrink trade with the USSR drastically, 
mindful of the potential recessionary consequences and of the need to pay their 
energy bills under the new, post-CMEA trading conditions. Similarly, it was not the 
Soviet intention to consciously slash imports from the other CMEA countries due to 
the tremendous harm this could (and did) bring to many sectors of the Soviet 





economy. Trade collapsed regardless, however, in the main due to deepening 
economic and political chaos in the USSR as the planning system crumbled and a 
deeply damaging phase of non-system ensued. Thus the USSR’s  cuts in imports from 
the five were not “because they had found other sources on more favourable terms but 
simply because they had no choice.”
4
  The CEE states learnt from this damaging 
forced retreat from the increasingly chaotic and unpredictable Soviet market that a 
strategic trade reorientation was not only politically justified but a practical economic 
necessity as well.   
 
2. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA DURING THE EU PRE-
ACCESSION YEARS. 
 
Key Challenges: Structural Deficits and Stagnant Exports  
 
Once the USSR and all the attendant ideological and “imperial” baggage had gone, 
Hungary and the newly independent Czech and Slovak Republics had to develop their 
relations with Russia – also a newly independent state  – in conditions that were 
fundamentally different from, but nevertheless involved a substantial legacy of, the 
Soviet era. As far as economic relations with Russia were concerned, the three faced 
some common key challenges during the 1990s and early 2000s. These included: the 
need to ensure stable energy supplies in the context of total supply dependency on 
Russia; put in place a large number of bilateral agreements covering a whole variety 
of issues; the need to tackle large trade imbalances that quickly emerged as an 
established feature of their residual trade with Russia and which mainly reflected the 
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energy import bill; the urge to raise the level of exports to Russia and make trade 
relations less asymmetrical (for economic reasons and because of feelings of 
vulnerability); the need to resolve the abovementioned Soviet-era transferable rouble 
debts that Russia inherited, which needed agreement on how they would be paid, what 
the convertible currency value would be and how costs of Russian troop withdrawal 
would be offset. The amounts involved were $1.6bn owed to Slovakia, $1.7bn to 




Trade relations with Russia settled down into the same broad pattern for all three 
countries and remained more or less stable over the 1993-2003 period. With Russia 
having inherited the Soviet role of monopoly supplier of gas and oil, imports were 
largely consisting of fossil fuels, delivered via the pipeline infrastructures constructed 
during the CMEA era.
6
 Energy trade was the core determinant of structural trade 
deficit with Russia. Another key similarity was the inability to correct this imbalance 
with export growth. With some modest fluctuations along the way, the $ values of 
Czech and Slovak exports to Russia were the same in 2003 as 1993 meaning a 
substantial fall in real terms. Hungary’s situation was even less favourable, showing a 
huge fall in the nominal value of exports to Russia with the 2003 $ value only 58 per 
cent of the 1992 total. Steadily increasing import bills meant that all three countries’ 
deficits grew strongly, with a 255 per cent increase in the case of the Czech Republic, 
218 per cent for Slovakia (1993-2003), and 408 per cent for Hungary between 1992 
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and 2003. Table 1 contains the data on the three’s trade with Russia between 1992 
and 2003.  
 
Numerous factors, well documented at the time, accounted for these post-CMEA 
trade patterns between Russia and the three. Clearly one important reason was to do 
with the nature of CMEA exchanges which included large scale exchange of CEE 
“soft” goods for Soviet “hard” goods (essentially energy and other raw materials). 
Thus a considerable portion of CEE exports to the USSR were not viable after 1990. 
Second, general chaos and weak demand in the Soviet and subsequently in the 
Russian market, coupled with Russia’s own strategic westward orientation during the 
Yeltsin period were also important. As Votapek noted, for the Czech Republic at least  
a basic problem was “the undercapitalisation of Czech exporters and consequently a 
higher sensitivity to risks that trading with Russia poses: the failure of Russian 




Third was the large scale reorientation of trade to the West, encouraged by economic 
necessity as well as foreign and security policy imperatives. Table 2 illustrates the 
degree of trade reorientation that had occurred by the middle 1990s. The signing of 
Europe Agreements with rapid moves to free trade with the EU obviously stimulated 
further growth of trade with Western Europe and consolidated the strategic 
reorientation in fact already underway in 1990. Lavigne pointed out that a Soviet-
Hungarian bilateral agreement was reached in March 1990 after “Hungary had 
suspended, in January 1990, the export licences granted to the Hungarian enterprises 
to sell to the USSR, then renewed them on a case-by-case basis, so as to divert as few 
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goods as possible to the CMEA market and prevent the export to the USSR of goods 




Post-CMEA Integration without Russia – CEFTA 
 
Though dwarfed by the value of the collapse of their individual trade with the USSR, 
the decline of the mutual trade of the five was still significant. Yet the prospects for 
reviving those trade relations and putting them on sound commercial footings turned 
out to be much more favourable because the common goal EU membership also gave 
rise to the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Russia was, of course, 
outside these dual processes. Convened in the framework of the Visegrad Group 
(VG), CEFTA was a regional integration initiative founded exclusively by and for 
CEE and was, therefore, the closest thing to a revival of sorts of the CMEA grouping. 
CEFTA was created under the terms of the Cracow Treaty signed in December 1992 
by the governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland who thereby agreed to 
begin mutual trade liberalisation. By the time it became operational (1 March 1993) 
there were, of course four members. The subsequent accessions of Bulgaria (1997) 
and Romania (1999) completed the ex-CMEA contingent, with Slovenia having 
entered in 1996. The prime objective of CEFTA was to completely liberalise trade in 
industrial products by 2001 and substantially liberalise agricultural trade. Though 
initial expectations were low, and the VG leaders were keen to play down its 
significance and encourage a shady existence for CEFTA (in order to pre-empt any 
talk that this could become an alternative to EU membership), CEFTA achieved some 
very positive results. Between 1993 and 1998 intra-CEFTA trade grew fast: Czech 
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exports to CEFTA increased by 365 per cent over that period. Hungarian, Polish and 
Slovak exports to CEFTA grew by 442 per cent, 298 per cent and 304 per cent 
respectively.
9
    
 
Whilst the exact impact of the reintegration effects of CEFTA vis-à-vis economic 
relations with Russia was never analysed, it seems fairly safe to assert that the 
gravitational pull of preferential trade within CEFTA would certainly not have been a 
positive influence. Indeed, by 1997 the level of intra-CEFTA trade was in stark 
contrast to the Soviet domination of intra-CMEA trade and marginal role of trade 
among the rest: Czech exports to CEFTA were eight times greater than exports to 
Russia, Hungary’s three times greater and Slovakia’s sixteen times greater.
 
As for 
Russia’s omission from CEFTA, three factors were of particular importance. First, 
CEFTA’s creation and early existence was against the backdrop of the so-called 
“CMEA syndrome” which basically meant a reluctance to participate in integration 
organisations with any ex-CMEA partner, but especially Russia. EU pressure, exerted 
during Europe Agreement negotiations, was an important driver of the VG states’ 
mutual trade liberalisation and also restricted the scope of CEFTA to those countries 
in line for EU associate membership. Second, as well as the absence of any agenda to 
include it, Russia itself showed no interest in CEFTA either in terms of membership 
or desire to influence it in any way, not even after Ukraine expressed membership 
aspirations in 1995. Third, Russia was excluded because of the specific character of 
CEFTA as an actual bona fide part of the EU pre-accession process. CEFTA became 
increasingly acknowledged as a device for future EU members to foster their mutual 
integration en route to the EU. Its enlargement criteria, established in Brno during the 
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second annual summit of CEFTA Prime Ministers in September 1995, stipulated that 
prospective CEFTA members must have accomplished the following: membership of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO); have signed a Europe Agreement with the EU; 
have signed bilateral free trade agreements with all existing CEFTA members. At this 
point the identity of CEFTA was clarified as a club for those post-communist states 
committed to Euro-Atlantic integration and acknowledged by the EU as future 
members.      
 
Domestic Politics and Strategic Relations with Russia: Impact on Trade Dynamics 
 
Finally, it is interesting to consider the broad influence of political relations with 
Russia during this long transition period. The lack of any regional framework to 
revive trade relations with Russia was not compensated for by any bilateral initiatives. 
As well as the CMEA Syndrome, the prospects for revitalised economic links were 
not helped by certain political constraints that emerged in the early 1990s. Russian 
opposition to NATO enlargement and constant striving to block the accession of 
former CMEA partners was the core problem though frustration with Russia’s failure 
to meet commitments in resolving the terms of and actually paying off CMEA-era 
debt was also a source of tension. Yet this narrative is too simplistic in itself as there 
were in fact some notable differences in governmental attitudes to Russia, both within 
and between countries, in play during this period. The political background and 
ideologies of the party in power caused some volatility in political relations with 
Russia. There were certainly periods where economic relations with Russia did have 
higher priority, especially in the case of Slovakia, but these varied levels of cordiality 
11 
 
in political relations with Russia were never really reflected one way or the other in 
actual trade levels..  
 
After the Velvet Divorce Czech and Slovak relations with Russia moved in opposite 
directions. The strong Czech pre-occupation with the NATO and EU membership 
endeavour, coupled with the convenient geopolitical position of the Czech Republic – 
it no longer bordered any ex-Soviet states – meant that foreign policy towards Russia 
was characterised by disinterest and lack of engagement and “Russia disappeared 
from the cognitive map of both the Czech political elite and the population at large.”
10
 
A residual fear of Russia remained, however. Opposition to NATO entry was read as 
evidence of Russian ambitions to retain a strong influence in Central Europe and 
underscored the importance of joining NATO and the EU. Otherwise, over this 
period, which endured until 1999, Czech interest was focused on specific economic 
issues, in particular the security of gas and oil supplies and striving for progress on 
the repayment of Russia’s debt to the Czech Republic. Trade and integration with the 
EU (and to some extent CEFTA) were, however, the undisputed strategic priorities.  
 
Slovakia, by contrast, became increasingly disenfranchised from Euro-Atlantic 
integration due to the authoritarian tendencies of the government led by Vladimir 
Mečiar. Slovakia therefore followed a distinct eastern agenda based on notions of a 
special relationship with Russia centred on aspirations for close economic relations 
that would maintain the levels of trade that characterised the CMEA era. Even before 
the split of Czechoslovakia and collapse of the USSR Meciar revealed his clear 
ambition to rescue the Slovak military industrial complex which was at the core of 
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Slovakia’s high level of exposure to the Soviet market. In 1991 Mečiar stated that 
“(o)ur diagnosis is not complicated. If we manage to remain oriented on the eastern 
market and preserve trade with the USSR, we shall have lower unemployment…the 
Soviets have given us general approval for the export of weapons produced under 
their licence.”
11
  Despite close political links with Russia and the signing of various 
bilateral agreements on economic cooperation – including some initial moves towards 
a Slovak-Russia free trade agreement in 1996 - Slovak ambitions to revive their 
economy via demand from Russia were not realised. As Table 1 shows exports did 
not grow at all and the main trend was an alarming deterioration in Slovakia’s balance 
of trade due to fast rising oil and gas import costs. 
 
Slovak and Czech relations with Russia converged after Mikuláš Dzurinda replaced 
Mečiar in September 1998. Slovakia immediately renewed its commitment to EU and 
NATO accession. Repercussions for the relationship with Russia did not entail an 
unfriendly tone in political relations with Russia but, as official government 
announcements in October 1998 stressed, Russia remained a key economic partner 
especially as far as imports of strategic energy resources was concerned. The  
objective was “to have  ‘correct’, ‘balanced’, ‘partner-like’ and ‘mutually 
advantageous’ relations with Russia.”
12
 Czech relations with Russia seemed to ease 
also after the final confirmation in 1997 that NATO enlargement would go ahead 
along with the election of a more Russia-friendly government. Votapek noted that 
“there was an ever more positive view of the mutual relations in the Czech Republic, 
too. In the summer of 1998, when the minority Social Democratic cabinet took office, 
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it declared the development of relations with Russia as one of its foreign policy 
priorities.”
13
   
 
Turning now to Hungary, official political attitudes to Russia and stress on the 
importance of economic ties tended to oscillate. Póti identifies four main phases after 
1990. Following the divorce phase, “peaceful co-existence” characterised the 1992-94 
period in which – with the USSR and with it the ‘ideological content’ of tensions with 
Hungary now gone – relations between Russia and Hungary gradually stabilised. 
Nonetheless, there was a surviving element of “distrust and fear of instability (on the 
Hungarian side) and growing opposition (on the issue of NATO enlargement) on the 
Russian side.”
14
 The subsequent 1994-1998 period of “normality” was interesting 
because the election of a leftist leaning government under Gyula Horn led to more 
emphasis on relations with Russia, including a high priority for the Russian market. 
Several issues caused relations to deteriorate after 1998, culminating in Russia’s 
decision to cancel Prime Minister Kasyanov’s official visit in early 2001.
15
 
Government change in Hungary played a key role with the new centre-right 
Fidesz/MDF government led by Viktor Orbán, both in its rhetoric and policy choices, 
inclined to a far more cautious and suspicious stance on Russia.  The “general attitude 
of the Orbán government towards Russia was characterised by the perception of a 
kind of cultural supremacy, a combined anti-communism/Russianism that still 
associated Moscow with the past, the fear of Russia’s imperial resurgence, its lack of 
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diplomatic style and the fashionable trend of neglecting Russia.”
16
 This “distancing” 
prevailed until the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), in its longstanding alliance 
with the Alliance of Free Democrats – Hungarian Liberal Party(SZDSZ), won the 
2002 elections in Hungary. In the context of Putin’s changed approach to Central 
Europe noted above, the centre-left government, led by Péter Medgyesi, again 
reversed course and declared the need to “reset” relations with Russia, especially for 
trading reasons.  
 
In sum, despite the differences in official political attitudes to Russia and variations in 
the extent to which there were inclinations to cultivate closer economic relations, the 
results in terms of actual levels and patterns of exports to Russia were very similar. In 
fact there were no real perceptible differences in the experiences of each of the 
countries. The case of Slovakia in the 1994-1998 period, where the revival of CMEA-
era levels of trade with Russia was the core economic (and foreign policy) strategy, 
was the most notable evidence that stagnation of export trade with Russia was not so 
much connected to the state of political ties. The stagnant and turmoil-ridden Russian 
economy was of overriding importance, along with structural limitations of the three 
that affected export potential to Russia at that time, especially in Slovakia 
 
3. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AFTER EU ACCESSION  
 
This section looks at some aspects of economic relations between Russia and the three 
since EU accession. It covers four areas. First, the main trade trends since EU 
accession and the key determinants of post-2004 trends. Second, the three’s energy 
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trade relationship with Russia which remains the major vestige of the socialist 
integration experience. Third, bilateral intergovernmental economic cooperation 
between Russia and the three. Fourth, some observations about the relationship 
between governments’ perspectives on relations with Russia and the conduct of 
economic relations during the post-2004 years..  
 
Trade with Russia after EU Accession – New Trends 
 
As noted above, during the transition period exports of the three to Russia lacked 
dynamism, either stagnating or shrinking. By contrast, since EU accession exports to 
Russia have shown very strong growth. Between 2004 and 2010 Czech exports had 
increased by 347 per cent, Hungarian by 350 per cent and Slovak by 713 per cent 
(Table 3). In 2010 Czech exports to Russia accounted for 16.7 per cent of total extra-
EU exports, compared to 10.8 per cent in 2004. For Hungary 15.6 per cent in 2010 
compared to 19.8 per cent and for Slovakia 25.4 per cent and 9.1 per cent respectively 
(Table 4). In terms of the commodity structure of trade, Czech exports to Russia are in 
a wide range of manufactured industrial goods and mainly machinery and transport 
equipment (especially cars), chemicals, food products and construction materials. 
Slovakia’s main export lines to Russia are machinery and transport equipment 
(especially cars), chemical and allied products, other industrial goods and fabrics. 
Hungary’s most important exports to Russia are in machinery and transport 
equipment, pharmaceuticals, chemical and allied products and foodstuffs. As for 
imports from Russia, in all three countries these are dominated  by raw materials and 
oil and gas, which account for around 85 per cent, 90 per cent, and 90 per cent of the 




An obvious question concerns the influence of actual EU membership on trade with 
Russia and the extent to which factors connected to EU entry accounted for the surge 
in growth of exports to Russia which became apparent after 2003? It seems that there 
is no strong evidence that the actual EU entry per se was the key cause of the 
observed trade growth. Certain economic consequences of the longer term process of 
EU accession played a major role however in terms of the economic development and 
changing capacities experienced by the three. The large inflows of foreign direct 
investment have built up export capacity, including in the sectors that are now most 
important in exports to Russia and which have experienced rapid growth in recent 
years (e.g. passenger cars). The changing capacity of the three enabled them to benefit 
from the boom in Russian imports that took off after 2000. This in turn was on the 
back of high levels of economic growth in Russia, and the Russian state’s use of 
buoyant oil revenues to significantly raise household incomes (especially of state 
employees in major cities) and fuel consumer spending. Between 2005 and 2010 the 
value of Russia’s imports more than doubled from US$ 79 billion to US$ 197 billion, 
having reached a pre-crisis peak of US$ 230 billion in 2008.
17
 As well as the three, 
most EU states experienced strong growth in their exports to Russia, demonstrating 
that the growth of the three’s exports was mainly part of a wider trend. Overall EU 
exports to Russia more or less doubled in value between 2004 and 2010 (Table 3). 
The other ex-CMEA states followed this trend also with Poland’s exports growing by 
211 per cent, those of Romania by 528 per cent and Bulgaria by 224 per cent. 
 
EU Entry and Energy Dependence 
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When it comes to CMEA era interconnections that are still present in economic 
relations between Russia and the three, the major and most obvious case of this is to 
do with energy dependence and Russia’s role – inherited from the USSR - as the main 
supplier of oil and gas. Deep integration of the energy sector had been among the few 
notable successes of socialist economic integration and not so easy to undo as other 
communist era linkages. The physical infrastructure for oil and gas supply and transit 
is still very much operational and vital today as Russia remains the principal supplier 
of oil and natural gas. As with the other ex-CMEA members, energy supply and 
security has remained a major aspect of current Czech, Hungarian and Slovak 
economic and political relations with Russia throughout the post-CMEA/post-USSR 
era. Russia maintained the Soviet reputation as a reliable supplier after the end of the 
CMEA. There were no supply disruptions during the EU pre-accession period, even 
during testy phases in political relations and perceived instability in Russia. Slovakia 
and Hungary kept their traditional levels of dependency on Russian supplies and 
further integration, while the Czech Republic did follow a diversification policy, its 
advantageous geographical location easing the logistical task of building up other 
supply sources. By 2001 its dependence on Russian oil and gas had dropped by 




As far as energy security/dependency issues since EU entry are concerned, the biggest 
questions are focused on gas. Dependency on Russia is high in all three cases but does 
vary. In 2009, Russia provided 83 per cent of Hungary’s total gas imports and 70 per 
cent of total gas consumption. For Slovakia the amounts were 94.5 per cent and 100 
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per cent respectively, and 69 per cent and 81 per cent for the Czech Republic. 
Hungary and Slovakia are supplied primarily by pipelines coming through Ukraine 
from Russia. Around 30 per cent of Czech gas imports come from Norway via the 
Olbernhauborder transfer station.
19
 Supply contracts are negotiated by the main gas 
transmission system operators in each country - RWE Transgas Net in the Czech 
Republic, FGSZ Ltd in Hungary and Slovensky Plynarensky Priemysel, a.s in 
Slovakia – all of which have tended to work on the basis of long term deals with 
Gazexport. Gas supply became an increasingly hot topic after Russia’s disputes with 
Ukraine disrupted supplies, first in 2007 and again in 2009. The 2009 crisis, which 
occurred at the coldest time of year and caused public anxiety about energy security 





Shortly after the 2009 crisis the Czech Republic and Slovakia both declared their 
official support for the Nabucco gas pipeline project backed by the EU.
21
  Hungary of 
course was already an established proponent of Nabucco. Diversification is however, 
not a short term game due to infrastructure issues and also because “pipeline politics” 
are rather complex. Commercial interests of the main energy companies play a key 
role, including transit fees (another remnant of CMEA-era arrangements). Also, 
dependency on Russian gas coming through Ukraine may (then at least) have been 
construed as the issue rather than dependency on Russian gas per se.  Hence 
Hungary’s concomitant support for and involvement in Russia’s South Stream 
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pipeline and former Hungarian Prime Minister Gyurcsány’s 2009 statement that 
“Hungary is interested in having as many pipelines as possible.”
22
 In April 2012, 
Hungarian energy and oil company MOL announced its withdrawal from the Nabucco 
project. Despite speculation that this reflected Hungary’s stand-off with the EU over 
various controversial political reforms, Orban stated that Hungary was switching 
allegiance to Russia’s South Stream alternative for “very simple economic reasons.”
23
 
Moreover, the Nabucco project has been flagging for some time and other major 
stakeholders had already expressed major doubts, including RWE of Germany.
24
 
Either way, diversification strategies are also fluid, with economic and political 
motivations not always easy to disentangle. Oil and gas dependence on Russia is 
clearly the most visible and significant remnant of CMEA-era integration and the 
question of whether EU membership has unleashed a strong dynamic for further 
diversification and a longer term strategy of disengagement from dependency on 
Russia remains rather ambiguous.   
 
Nuclear electricity generation is another important, albeit lower profile, aspect of 
energy relations with Russia. As with oil and gas supply, the nuclear energy industry 
is another significant leftover from the CMEA. Whereas the impact of EU 
membership on the sustainability of gas and oil dependency on Russia has at least 
been subject to discourses about possible alternative sources, the situation on nuclear 
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energy is rather clear. The Russian role looks secure and may even become more 
significant. Nuclear power is a key part of the energy mix in all three countries, 
accounting for 33 per cent of domestic electricity supply in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary and over half  (55 per cent) in Slovakia. This comes from six reactors in the 
Czech Republic and four each in Hungary and Slovakia.
25
 All the reactors are Soviet-
era, commissioned and constructed by Soviet partners and these days the Russian 
nuclear energy giant Rosatom is a key partner. Rosatom subsidiary TVEL is the 
exclusive supplier nuclear fuel for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Russia 
has also in past received spent fuel for processing on its territory. Rosatom also plays 
a key role in the supply of spare parts for reactors and maintenance schedules and has 
also been involved in certain crisis operations. In Hungary, for example, following a 
serious incident in April 2003 in which water contamination from the fuel rod 
cleaning system occurred, specialists from TVEL carried out the decontamination 
work with their Hungarian counterparts. As with pipeline systems, changes to this 
part of the energy infrastructure cannot be made except in the longer term and would 
be very expensive. In any case there seems to be strong commitment to continue with 
current arrangements and even possibly expand Russian involvement. During 2011 
Russia and Hungary held talks on Russian companies’ involvement in the planned 
modernisation of Hungary’s PAKS nuclear facility. In 2009 Russia and Slovakia 
signed a long term deal in nuclear power engineering that involved, amongst other 
things, Slovakia’s “support for the participation of Russian companies in modernizing  
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 Nuclear energy is also an official field of bilateral economic, 
scientific and technological cooperation between Russia and Slovakia. As for the 
Czech Republic, in 2010, TVEL replaced Westinghouse  as supplier of fuel for the 
Czech Temelin plant until 2020. Furthermore, the Rosatom subsidiary 
Atomstroyexport was in one of the consortia that bid and was in strong contention to 
win the (now suspended) tender to build two new reactors at the Temelin plant in the 
Czech Republic. It remains to be seen how the fear of significant Russian presence 
within strategic sectors will affect the future developments of nuclear power capacity, 
yet it is also the case that the involvement of Russian companies has strong internal 
support. For now, the nuclear energy partnership is an important, stable and trouble-
free (i.e. has not suffered from any equivalent of the gas crises) dimension of bilateral 
relations with Russia. 
 
Intergovernmental Cooperation on Trade and Economic Relations 
 
Bilateral Intergovernmental Commissions for the promotion of trade and economic 
cooperation were set up in the aftermath of the collapse of the CMEA and then the 
USSR in an attempt to salvage the viable parts of mutual trade and handle various 
practical aspects of post-CMEA/post-USSR economic relations with Russia. 
Established in the early 1990s in the framework of the need to establish a whole range 
of bilateral agreements with the newly independent Russian Federation the 
Commissions played useful initial roles to do with bilateral trade arrangements and 
negotiations to resolve transferable rouble debts. They gradually faded from view, 
however, and by the time of EU accession seemed to have fulfilled their purpose.  
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Duleba observed that the abolition of the Slovak Commission, by the Dzurinda 
government in 2002, was an “example of the narrowing of the bilateral tools of 
Slovak foreign policy in relations with East European countries in the field of foreign 
trade.”
27
  The bilateral commissions have undergone somewhat of a revival in the 
post-2004 period as governments of the three have sought to more actively promote 
exports to Russia and further develop the business/economic partnership. Not long 
after EU accession, therefore, these bodies were revived and reinvigorated and  
invested with new purpose and given much higher priority. Perhaps more a case of 
suggestions of echoes of CMEA-era practices rather than direct descendants of 
socialist economic integration, the bilateral inter-governmental bodies are now firmly 
entrusted with the task of promoting trade and various aspects of economic 
cooperation between Russia and each of the three. The Czech, Hungarian and Slovak 
bilateral intergovernmental commissions with Russia bring together leading 
politicians, civil servants, regional actors and industrialists for extended meetings that 
can cover specific contracts and map out medium and long-term economic 
cooperation.
28
 As well as sectoral cooperation and promotion of business links, the 
commissions are currently working with political authorities in regions outside the 
main centres of Moscow and St. Petersburg. To give an example from Slovak-Russian 
bilateral relations, the current cooperation agreement between the regions of Zlin in 
Slovakia and Yaroslavl Oblast in Russia envisages cooperation in the following 
fields: tourism, spa business, agriculture, industry and job creation. 
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Though an assessment of the precise impact of these Intergovernmental Commissions 
is not within the scope of this paper (and it may be too early to gauge their 
effectiveness at this stage) some observations are as follows. First, they illustrate that 
contrary to CEE states initial assumptions, EU entry did not in fact mean that all 
competence on economic and trade relations with Russia was now gone (to the 
Brussels level) and many possible avenues for productive bilateral cooperation on 
trade and economic relations were actually still open. Second, official statements 
seem to affirm that these bilateral bodies are regarded positively and can be good 
vehicles for trade development and other forms of economic cooperation. They can 
certainly be regarded also as useful channels for intergovernmental communication 
and dialogue even during times when relations at the political-diplomatic level may 
be going through a tense phase. They even seem to be vehicles for shielding official 
economic relations from negative fallout of difficulties that may be occurring at the 
political/diplomatic level.  Some examples of positive rhetoric about these bodies are 
as follows. The  meeting of the Hungarian-Russian Intergovernmental Committee for 
Economic Cooperation that took place in Moscow during March 2011 discussed 
“cooperation opportunities in the field of energy, agriculture, finances and transport” 
and signed a Joint Declaration of Modernisation and Partnership’ that “outlines the 
long-term cooperation opportunities for business organisations, and creates a 
framework for cooperation between the two governments in modernisation, research 
and development”
29
  The October 2010 Moscow meeting of Czech-Russian 
Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Industrial and Scientific Cooperation 
involved two days of bilateral talks and expressed “support for important Czech-
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Russian projects or the utilisation of the possibilities offered by the EU-RF initiative 
Partnership for Modernisation and Cooperation.”
30
 In a press statement during his 
2009 visit to Bratislava Vladimir Putin remarked that the Slovak-Russian 
Intergovernmental Commission on Cooperation in the Economy, Science and 
Technology had an important role in “expanding business connections, investment 
partnerships, and cooperation in high-technology industries.”
31
 Third, the extent to 
which these Intergovernmental Commissions actually represent some kind of 
continuity with CMEA-type relations would be more pertinent if these bodies were 
exclusive to ex-CMEA states but they are not as many states (EU, non-EU and non-
European) actually have similarly named intergovernmental cooperation bodies with 
Russia.
32
 The question, again not within the scope of this contribution, would be 
whether there is anything distinct about the Commissions of the ex-CMEA states.  
 
Alternative Perspectives on Russia and Economic and Business Relations  
 
Finally, some comments about government attitudes to Russia in the three and the 
conduct of economic relations with Russia. First, the main political parties (at least of 
the 2004-2010 period) have been polarised on the question of relations with Russia. 
Centre right parties tend to be Russia-cautious or even Russia-hostile, at least when it 
comes to their rhetoric, while left-leaning parties represent the Russia-friendly wing 
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of the political spectrum in each country.
33
 The revival and reinvigoration of the 
Intergovernmental Commissions after EU accession has been associated with left-
leaning governments. After two years out of office, the current SMER government in 
Slovakia, for example, has made the Slovak-Russian Intergovernmental Commission 
on Cooperation in the Economy, Science and Technology a high priority and is 
currently investing quite heavily in increasing its role and effectiveness. Secondly, the 
tendency of the left-leaning parties to prioritise economic relations with Russia 
reflects the significance of CMEA/socialist era networks of government officials and 
the natural ability of their (USSR-educated) leaders to be comfortable in Moscow and 
enjoy close and friendly relations with their Russian counterparts. The third point is 
that the significance of the left-right divide on relations with Russia is these days far 
less significant than it was in the pre-accession period and has been undergoing 
definite refinement as the post-accession period has progressed. Regardless of parties’ 
political rhetoric about Russia it is clear that the growing significance of economic 
relations with Russia obviously contributes to the current situation where pragmatism 
outweighs, or at least is not too compromised by, ideological or values-based foreign 
policy stances on Russia. In the case of the Czech Republic the political tensions of 
recent years – including the ramifications of the proposal to locate part of the US 
Ballistic Missile Defence system in the Czech Republic and Poland and various 
criticisms of the Russian state (over its democracy and human rights records, actions 
in Georgia etc.) that came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not prevent a 
largely ‘business as usual’ approach in the economic and business sphere. An 
important role in this was played by the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade, whose 
influence on Czech relations with Russia has grown, as Kratochvil informs us: “in 
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direct proportion with the increasing importance of Czech-Russian trade relations. 
Contrasting with the problematic political relations (especially during 2007 and 2008) 
the representatives of the Ministry of Industry and Trade strived to separate the 




It is fair to assume that the Slovak Ministry of economy and Hungarian Ministry of 
Economy and Transport are also important actors in relations with Russia. Finally, the 
case of Hungary over the last two years has shown that even parties prone to 
particularly strong anti-Russia rhetoric, when they get into power, can rapidly learn 
the need to be pragmatic. When entering office the current government of Viktor 
Orban seemed to rapidly jettison its anti-Russia credentials. After that election in 
April 2010,  various meetings of important bilateral economic cooperation 
committees were cancelled by the Russian side and Orban’s first meeting with Putin 
in November 2010 was unproductive with a very negative impact on the talks caused 
by “the Kremlin’s mistrust and Hungary’s lack of interesting assets.”
35
 Racz noted 
that the Orban government refrained from any criticism of the 2011 Russian 
parliamentary elections, no doubt mindful of the serious effects provocative rhetoric 
can have on Russia’s willingness to do business.
36
 Also, the current Hungarian 
enthusiasm for participation in the South Stream gas pipeline is somewhat at odds 
with comments made  by Orban in 2008 when he accused Gyurcsany of “treason” for 
signing the agreement on Hungary’s participation.  
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The post-1991 economic relations of Russia’s economic relations with former CMEA 
members has been a rather neglected topic. The changing fortunes of their exports to 
Russia after the 2004 EU enlargement has not been the subject of any detailed 
analysis. Though this is only a preliminary investigation and provides some details for 
only three of the ex-CMEA contingent of current EU members, it seems clear enough 
that actual EU membership per se was not the key factor that ignited a rapid growth in 
Visegrad countries’ exports to Russia. Rather, changing capacities in export-oriented 
industries based on inward investment during and after the EU pre-accession period 
have eventually fed into trade relations with Russia. This has been in the context of a 
surge in Russia’s economic growth and accompanying import boom and emergence 
of an increasingly financially empowered consumer society in Russia.  
 
As far as the longer term impact of socialist economic integration on contemporary 
economic relations is concerned, the most obvious enduring legacy of the CMEA is 
energy dependence, with Russia having maintained its traditional role as natural gas 
and oil supplier. There is no strong evidence that EU membership will inevitably lead 
the Visegrad ‘three’ to follow a deliberate strategy of eroding the energy relationship 
with Russia though diversification narratives did strengthen after the 2009 natural gas 
supply crisis. This is in contrast with the other Visegrad partner, Poland, which is 
relying on shale gas and development of a nuclear energy programme (it has no 
nuclear power stations at present) precisely to reduce its dependence on Russian gas.
37
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For the three nuclear power is actually another, but much lower profile, strand of the 
CMEA-era energy relationship and appears to be a stable and maybe even developing 
aspect of the energy partnership with Russia.  
 
Bilateral cooperation with Russia in trade and economic cooperation has been given 
new impetus since EU accessions with the resurrection of intergovernmental 
commissions initially set up in the immediate post-CMEA period. As Russia has such 
arrangements with many countries they should not be seen as some kind of legacy of 
the CMEA, but further research may show that the experience of the socialist era may 
be relevant for the particular scope and operation of bilateral cooperation between 
Russia and ex-CMEA countries. There is a clear legacy of the socialist period, 
however, when it comes to political perspectives on economic relations with Russia. 
Present-day left-leaning politicians who were once ‘reform communists’ are clearly 
strong supporters of close economic ties with Russia, which have been important parts 
of the economic and trade policy agendas during their terms in government. Yet the 
growth of export trade to Russia has grown so spectacularly in recent years has mean 
that even though centre-right parties have sought to use anti-Russia rhetoric for 
electoral purposes, once in office they adjust their positions for reasons of sheer 
pragmatism. Furthermore, the impact of differing party attitudes to Russia has been 
even more diluted because of the increasingly important roles played by the 
economy/trade ministries. 
 
Though this did not really become evident until the post-accession period, the 
sentiments of the ultra-radical Hungarian economists of the 1980s referred to in the 
introduction have proved largely accurate. This transformation remains nevertheless 
29 
 
somewhat one-sided. Internal reform deficiencies and lack of major economic 
restructuring has not managed to shake off the Soviet inheritance and remains 
primarily an exporter of energy. The three, on the other hand, have steadily grown and 
diversified their exports to Russia on the back of major FDI-led industrial 
restructuring. Though beyond the scope and purpose of this paper it should 
nevertheless be mentioned that the nature and significance of economic relations with 
Russia, not only for the three but all EU members, had become particularly resonant 
by mid-2014 due to the application of economic sanctions on Russia and the quiet 
attempts by individual member states to nevertheless minimize the impact on their 
own trade with Russia. Indeed, for the three, their Intergovernmental Trade and 
Economy Commissions have become important instruments for this very purpose. In 
an eerie echo of the CMEA era, CEE states’ current struggle over how far to try to 
avoid economically damaging reductions in exports to Russia is certainly not a 
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Appendix 1: Statistical Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Czech, Hungarian and Slovak Trade with Russia, 1992-2003 (US$ 
millions) 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Czech 
Exports 
N/A 593 548 630 694 767 650 379 385 490 517 584 
Czech 
Imports 




N/A (687) (715) (1246) (1310) (1084) (929) (1009) (1689) (1511) (1327) (1755) 
Hung. 
Exports 
1133 945 807 822 776 968 661 356 455 472 455 653 
Hung. 
Imports 























































N/A (980) (921) (1125) (1626) (1286) (1154) (1244) (2050) (2041) (1940) (2141) 
Sources: National Statistical Office of Hungary; National Statistical Office of 





Table 2: Reorientation of CEE-6 trade: exports, 1989-95 (per cent) 
 
CEE-6 exports to: 
 
1989 1995 
Former CMEA 47 23 
EU-15 35 63 
USA 2 2 
Japan 1 1 
Rest of the world 15 11 












Table 3: Czech, Hungarian and Slovak Trade with Russia 2004-2010 (Euro 
millions) 
 




770 1132 1504 2081 2911 1877 2672 347 
Czech 
Imports 
2184 3392 4224 3930 5987 3721 4885 224 
Czech 
Balance 
(1414) (2260) (2720) (1849) (3076) (1844) (2213)  
Hungary 
Exports 
738 943 1617 2229 2666 2124 2583 350 
Hungary 
Imports 
2875 3962 5118 4793 6651 4091 5196 180 
Hungary 
Balance 
(2137) (3019) (3501) (2564) (3985) (1967) (2613)  
Slovakia 
Exports 
271 398 549 959 1811 1416 1933 713 
Slovakia 
Imports 
2207 2980 4029 4017 5258 3473 4679 212 
Slovakia 
Balance 
(1936) (2582) (3480) (3058) (3447) (2057) (2746)  
EU 27 
Exports 






Table 4: Czech, Hungarian and Slovak Trade with Russia as per cent of total extra-
EU trade, 2004-2010 
 
Exports 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Czech 
Republic  
10.8 12.5 13.9 15.8 19.4 15.2 16.7 
Hungary 9.8 9.8 13.0 15.2 16.6 16.8 15.6 
Slovakia 9.1 12.1 12.5 17.0 25.6 24.9 25.4 



















19.7 29.7 29.2 22.9 26.8 22.5 20.4 
Hungary  18.8 24.7 27.6 22.5 28.2 23.4 24.2 
Slovakia  43.5 48.2 45.2 35.8 38.9 34.6 34.0 













Table 5: Energy Security – Dependence On Russian Natural Gas - Imports from 
Russia as % pf  total gas imports of new EU member states in 2009 
 
 















Table 6: Nuclear Electricity Generation in the  Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia   
 
 No. of Soviet-built  
reactors 




Czech Republic 6 33 
Hungary 4 33 
Slovakia 4 55 
 
Source: Dangerfield (2013) 
 
